Abstract. What I want to do is to build the game model of the government, the media, and the public in the public crisis event based on evolutionary game replication dynamic analysis method. The thesis analyzes the game relation of in the process of information release, reports and follow, then gives the stability strategy of each participation main body in different situations, and use three-dimensional map to demonstrate the gradual trend of different strategy combinations. At the same time, it takes the Songhua River water pollution incident as an example, analyzes the behavior changes of the government, the media and internet users in the crisis event. The simulation results showes that the government should implement an the crisis management plan to early release, highly guide and highly regulation.
Introduction
With the continuous development of Internet technology and communication technology, all kinds of government web sites, Internet forums and micro-blog network platform has become an important network public space for people to acquire information and publish opinion, provides a new channel and discourse platform for the public to participate in government's public management. But because of the virtual and concealment of the Internet, the network has become a advantageous tool for many illegal enterprises took the opportunity to spread false information to seek exorbitant profits, serious threat to the prosperity and stability of our country. Therefore, the information exchange and communication between the government, media and the public is particularly important in public crisis management process. Form the effective interaction relations between the government, the media and public can prevent rumors spread and further panic, also can promote the public crisis solved smoothly.
In recent years, the domestic and foreign scholars have conducted some research on the relationship between government, media and the public in the process of information release. Harold Lasswell (1948) published the "transmission structure and function in society", this paper first puts forward 5W model, namely who, whom, what channel, what, what effect [1] . In this model, the audience can only passively accept the political purpose and information of the communicators, without the right to choose information. It reflects the techniques and function of the government control media, and provides a train of thought and framework for political analysis of the media. Habermas (1999) pointed out that the media is a kind of public instruments, and we should build the country's public sector, in order to make the media play a significant role in promoting the national democratic process, but the theory gave no details about how regulate the public field [2] . Terrence A. Maxwell (2003) had made a study on the emergency communication model among government, media, and the public. They believed that the government department is mainly responsible for collecting the emergency information, and timely inform the public; the main task of media is coordinating the relationship between the government and the public, and provides services such as technical problems interpretation; and the public is largely in response to government decision, and affect the government [3] . The domestic scholars had research on the relationship between government, media and the public in the process of government emergency information release. Hong Li, Chai Chunying (2009) argued that the media has the intermediary and carrier function in the process of public opinion construction. The interactive relationship between the media and the government was expressed in two ways, namely the mutual dependence and game [4] . Zhao Yuan (2010) put forward suggestions that how benign interaction between the government, the media and the public under the background of the government information disclosure [5] . Xu Xu (2009) based on network asked administration to analysis the network asked administration, communication process and result [6] . Yi Chang (2010) take the "panyu waste incineration events" as an example, analysis of benign interaction path of the government, the media and the public in the process of crisis management [7] . Xia Baocheng (2013) through analysis of the position evolution of government and media, explored the construction of the cooperation relations of government and the media, in order to effective and reasonable disposal of emergencies [8] . To sum up, in the current trend of information high development and news media gradually popular, the interests of the public participation in social supervision is more and more strong. The government, the media and the public must have a reasonable game strategy. But study on the concrete interactive scheme of the government, the media and the public in game mode is relatively few. Therefore, this paper discusses the different strategies and results of the government, the media and the public from the perspective of game theory modeling and simulation.
The "Government-Media-Public" Evolutionary game Model in Public Crisis events
Due to the different interest demands, the government, the media and the public have existed game relationship in the process of information release, reports and follow. The following to analysis the different strategies and results of tripartite game groups based on evolutionary game theory.
The Model Assumptions
The game players. The government, the media, the public;
The strategy policy set. The government can choose two kinds of strategies, namely released the information and don't release information; Media can choose two kinds of strategies, namely reports news and don't reports news; the public also can choose two kinds of strategies namely follow and not follow.
If the government chooses to release information, it needs to pay the cost of C, if the media choose to reports and the public choose to follow the news, the government, media and the public will gain extra profit R, r1, r2, they paid for: R-C, r1, r2; if the government to release and media to reports information, but the public don't to follow the information, the media will pay for the cost of C1, at this point, the government, media and the public are not gain additional revenues, and the public will be affected by the loss of w1, at this time, they paid for: -C, -C1, -w1; if the government to release information, but the media doesn't to report news, the public choose to follow the information, the government, the media and the public are all unable to obtain additional revenue, the media will be affected by the loss of t, the public also will be affected by the loss of w2, they paid for: -C, -t, -w2; if the government release information, but the media don't to report or the public don't to follow, the public will be affected by the loss of -g, they will pay for: -C, -t, -g.
Similarly, if the government chose not to release information, we can get the pay strategy of the government, the media and the public.
Participants behavior dimension and probability distribution. The government -release (p1) and don't released (1-p1) ;
The media -report (p2) and don't report (1-p2) ; The public -follow (p3) and don't follow (1-p3);
Building the Third-Party Dynamic Game Model
In order to get the profit function of each participant in the game, we built the game tree to represent the whole game process according to the above hypothesis and behavioral strategies. As shown in Figure I : Figure 1 . The third-party dynamic game model of the government, media and the public.
The Equilibrium Analysis of the Model
The replicated dynamic equation of the government chooses to release information. The expected return of government release information is U1, don't release information is U2, and the average income of government is U3. Therefore: 
From these we know: the replicated dynamic equation of the government chooses to release information is:
0, this means that the all levels is a stable state. 
p is the equilibrium point, so the government chooses to release information is evolutionary stable strategy.
is the equilibrium point, so the government doesn't chooses to release information is evolutionary stable strategy.
The dynamic trend and stability table of government departments under these conditions as shown in Figure II :
The X axis, Y axis and Z axis representing the p1, p2, p3: The replicated dynamic equation of the media chooses to report news. The expected return of media chooses to report is U4, don't report is U5, and the average income of media is U6. Therefore:
The Simulation and Result Analysis The Simulation Analysis
In this paper, take "the Songhua River water pollution incident" as an example to obtain the initial simulation data.
Jilin petrochemical company double benzene plant explosion on November 13, 2005. Hundreds of tons of benzene into the Songhua River, leading to coastal city are facing a serious ecological crisis, such as Harbin, Kiamusze and Khabarovsk in Russia etc.
According to statistics, there were 2063 media reported the event, and the public that paid attention to the incident were 16690 on November 27 [9] . Because of the limitation of the simulation software, this paper narrows a certain proportion of the total number of the network media and the public, to reduce the proportion of 5%. Namely the total number of network media about 100 and the public number about 500.
Proportion of the total number of the public and the network media is 5:1, so every step to increase the number of network media is 5 and every step to increase the number of the public is 25. Every step increase of the public and media are random with attitude, namely, support, neutrality and opposition attitude. Let the run step is 46. The government release information time and regulation time were twentieth step.
This paper carries out simulation using Netlogo software, mainly from the government information release, the government's credibility, the true extent of government information and the government guidance and supervision to simulation analysis of the behavioral changes of the government, the network media and the public in the Songhua River water pollution event.
Through changed the simulation parameters, we got different simulation results, and analysis them. We can repeat many times simulation of the simulation program, and then analysis the most representative quantity change chart.
The local government in jilin province, State Administration of work safety and State Environmental Protection Administration didn't release information acknowledge explosion may cause water pollution More than 10 days after the bombings [10] . Let the run step is 46, the government release information time was twentieth step. Other initial settings unchanged, only to change the government information release time, conducting several simulations of simulation program, and analysis the most representative quantity change chart. Figure III and Figure IV shows that the government intervention impact on the attitude of the public and network media is different in tenth step and in the thirtieth step. The government information release time more early, the time is more short that the public and network media attitudes to reach equilibrium state, and can achieve the better results. In this event, the government aphasia caused suspicions began to spread in the media and the public, and began to appear in local public panic.
In the same way, from the government's credibility, the true extent of government information and the government guidance and supervision to simulation analysis of the behavioral changes of the government, the network media and the public in the Songhua River water pollution event.
Analysis of Simulation Result
 The government released the information earlier, the better effect on response to the public crisis.
 The greater government's guidance, the more influence of network media and the public, but the supervision is larger influence of the network media, and had little impact on the public.
 The attitude of network media affects the public. A single network media impact on Internet users is very limited, but the network media to its interests, after considering the preference of public population attitude, reported the public crisis information selectively.
 In each scenario, the management effect of release early, high guidance and supervision scheme is better than the other schemes.
